The “We” in the “Me”:Solidarity and health care in the era of personalized medicine by Prainsack, Barbara
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/0162243917736139
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Prainsack, B. (2018). The “We” in the “Me”: Solidarity and health care in the era of personalized medicine.
Science, Technology and Human Values, 43(1), 21-44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243917736139
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. Jul. 2020
	 1	
This is not the final manuscript. The final version is available here: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0162243917736139 Please cite as: 
Prainsack B. 2017. The ‘We’ in the ‘Me’: Solidarity and Health Care in the Era of 
Personalized Medicine. Science, Technology & Human Values (online first: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243917736139) 
 
Professor Bob Simpson’s response to this article is available here: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0162243917735899 
 
 
The “We” in the “Me”:1 Solidarity and Healthcare in the Era of Personalized 
Medicine  
 
Abstract 
This paper challenges a key tacit assumption underpinning legal and ethical 
instruments in healthcare, namely that people are ideally bounded, independent, and 
often also strategically rational individuals. Such an understanding of personhood has 
been criticized within feminist and other critical scholarship as being unfit to capture 
the deeply relational nature of human beings. In the field of medicine, however, it also 
causes tangible problems. I propose that a solidarity-based perspective entails a 
relational approach and as such helps to formulate new solutions to complex ethical 
and regulatory questions, ranging from caring for people at the end of their lives to 
improving policies for organ donation and better governance of health data. It also 
underscores the importance of universal healthcare. Although a solidarity-based 
perspective does not require health to be seen as an individually enforceable right, it 
																																								 																					1	I would like to draw attention to Mette Nordahl Svendsen’s project that carries the reverse title: 
‘MeInWe – Personalized Medicine in the Welfare State” (meinwe.ku.dk). Our two projects, each in its 
own way, seek to bridge the opposition that Donna Dickenson described in her book Me Medicine vs. 
We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common Good (Dickenson 2013). 
	 2	
does influence our understanding of individual rights: It draws attention to how their 
meanings are shaped by shared social practices. I conclude by arguing that, in light of 
current pressures for medicine to become more personalized, using a relational 
understanding of personhood to shape policies and practices is a much needed 
endeavour.   
 
 
Keywords: Personalized Medicine, Precision medicine, relational autonomy, 
solidarity, end-of-life, organ donation, data governance, right to health 
 
Introduction 
There is currently a lot of excitement, and also considerable concern, about 
personalized medicine (e.g. Dickenson 2013; Vollmann et al. 2015). In its broadest 
definition personalized medicine seeks to match diagnosis and treatment more closely 
to the specific characteristics of individual patients. Variations of this idea are also 
referred to as stratified medicine, and as “precision medicine.” The latter term is used 
by some authors to mark a departure from the narrow focus on genetic and genomic 
information that personalized medicine had in the immediate aftermath of the Human 
Genome Project (Hedgecoe 2004; Juengst et al. 2016). Current iterations of 
personalized or “precision” medicine hold that people’s genetic makeup, their 
lifestyles and other environmental factors vary to such a degree that the analysis of 
symptoms, medical prognoses, and treatments should also be specific to each 
individual. In its extreme form, personalized medicine implies a radical 
individualization of medicine in the sense that every person is seen to represent a 
unique case of health or disease (NAS 2011; Prainsack 2015).  
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This idea of personalization goes hand in hand with a growing rhetoric around patient 
autonomy, shared decision-making, and “participatory medicine” (Keogh 2015; 
Prainsack 2017). The alliance between these discourses is not a coincidence: For 
personalized medicine to be realized, people need to invest data, time, and effort. In 
other words, personalized medicine requires considerable amounts of “patient work” 
(Strauss et al. 1982, 1997 [1985]). Patient empowerment, although often called for 
with the best intentions, at times serves as a discursive tool to sweep the more 
onerous, painful or costly sides of patient work under a shiny carpet. This is the case 
especially with data-driven and high-tech visions of personalized medicine that 
require patients to collect data and submit themselves to increasing levels of 
surveillance, yet without allowing them to bring to the decision making process what 
is valuable and meaningful to them (Prainsack 2017). If we want to prevent such a 
version of personalized medicine from becoming dominant we need to appropriate the 
concept and fill it with new meaning. Such a “new” meaning can draw upon many 
values and practices that have been around for a long time: It should include the 
acknowledgement of the importance of “thick descriptions”––that is, narrative 
information that includes more than a simplified range of predetermined parameters––
alongside quantified, digital data. It should also include an emphasis on personal 
relations alongside machine learning and automation, and the acknowledgement and 
harnessing of ambivalence amidst our quest for precision and clarity. Giving such 
“old” practices and values more room in contemporary understandings of 
personalized medicine is not only a timely project in the face of the fast proliferation 
of “precision medicine” programmes in the world; it is also an opportunity to revisit 
our understanding of the person in medicine more broadly.  
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Regulatory and ethical instruments that guide medical practice and research today are 
heavily influenced by the idea of persons as bounded, ideally independent 
(“autonomous”), and regularly also strategically rational individuals (Prainsack 2014; 
Dove et al. 2017). In medical practice and research more broadly, this understanding 
creates tangible problems, as I will argue below. In connection with personalized 
medicine, it poses the risk that personalization will contribute to a greater 
individualization of medicine––in the form of more responsibilities and duties being 
devolved to patients, an even greater shift to consumer-driven healthcare, or the 
decreasing willingness of people to pay into systems that could support others who 
they deem undeserving. I believe that this should and can be avoided. 
 
Building upon the work of scholars who have criticized the “tyranny of autonomy” in 
Western medicine (Foster 2009; see also O’Neill 2003; Manson & O’Neill 2007; Fox 
& Swazey 2008), my own critique focuses on an understanding of autonomy that 
regards people as independent, atomistic individuals. Following feminist and other 
critical scholarship (e.g. Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000) I argue that conceptualizing 
persons as bounded, ideally independent, and––due to the close connection between 
Western individualism and strategic rationality––regularly self-interested individuals 
is not only flawed, but has been an obstacle to ethical progress in the field. Using the 
concept of solidarity, I will suggest ways to overcome an unproductive focus on 
atomistic autonomy. This step is necessary to work towards a kind of personalized 
medicine that does not force us to choose between “Me Medicine” and “We 
Medicine” (Dickenson 2013). Another implication of a solidarity-based approach is a 
focus on healthcare that is affordable and accessible for all. This latter argument does 
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not entail a claim of the existence of an individual right to health: Our solidarity-
based approach is agnostic regarding whether an individual right to health does or 
should exist. As an approach that understands humans as relational beings whose 
wellbeing is dependent on the wellbeing of others, it posits that societies have a 
responsibility to meet the fundamental needs of everybody as well as they can. Such a 
perspective also affects how we understand individual rights in the sense that their 
meaning is always shaped by collective responsibilities and shared social practice. 
 
The person as a rational, bounded entity 
The autonomous individual has been the central bearer of agency in Western thought 
(e.g. C. Taylor 1985; Douzinas 2000; Richardson 2007; Battersby 2007; Siedentop 
2014). In other regions of the world, and in other times throughout human history, 
selfhood and human action have been conceived in a more “communal” sense (e.g. 
Tsai 2001; Bird-David 2004). This is the case, for example, when people’s actions are 
considered to be determined by the role that a person fulfills as part of her 
community, instead of being construed as the result of reasoned and strategically 
rational individual choices (see also Strathern 1988; Siedentop 2014).  
 
This Western notion of the autonomous individual is rooted in the notion of self-
ownership, whose many nuances are too manifold to do justice to in a short overview. 
The following characteristics, however, are central to self-ownership: Self-awareness, 
free will (independent from, and unmanipulated by, others), and the capacity to 
formulate life plans (see also Christman 2015). Some understandings of self-
ownership are strongly influenced by Immanuel Kant’s idea that human beings––as 
rational agents in the way just described––have an inherent dignity and must not be 
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treated merely as means to an end (see also Cohen 1995). Other understandings of 
autonomy qua self-ownership draw upon a more strategic, instrumental 
understanding of rationality whose early beginnings are often traced back to John 
Locke’s work on property (1689) as well as to his, and Thomas Hobbes’ (1651), 
conception of the “state of nature.” As is well known, the state of nature is shorthand 
for the (fictitious) circumstances under which humans lived before politically 
organized societies emerged. i Hobbes saw social institutions in the state of nature as 
reducible to individual choices, an idea that Charlotte Epstein called the “traditional 
founding myth for the rational actor” (Epstein 2013: 289; see also Murdoch 1992; 
Neal 1988). Individual choices needed to aim at self-preservation, and these choices 
in turn became seen as the building bricks of institutions. The focus on the rational 
and often also strategically reasoned action of individuals (typically individual men) 
also served to distinguish supposedly highly civilized from allegedly “primitive” or 
pagan societies: While the latter were considered to consist of parochial groups that 
each worshipped their own gods, the former were seen to comprise individuals 
coming together around shared beliefs and goals (Macfarlane 1978: 52). Larry 
Siedentop goes as far as arguing that by positing that every human being was created 
in God’s image and could have a personal relationship with God,  Christianity gave 
birth both to the idea of the individual and to the idea of free will: In contrast to 
antiquity, where the worship of family ancestors and the acceptance of one’s role 
within the extended family were the keys to immortality, Christianity gave each 
person responsibility for the resurrection of his or her own soul (Siedentop 2014). In 
this reading it was the free will of each individual that linked rationality to the goal of 
self-preservation.  Rationality was not merely a capacity that elevated human beings 
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above animals––and male citizens over women and slaves, who were seen as led 
mostly by their sensations and sentiments; it became instrumental to self-preservation. 
 
The rational choice paradigm has strongly influenced understandings of personhood 
in virtually every domain in Western Societies. Because of its promise to make 
human practice measurable and predictable, it has been particularly attractive also for 
scientific disciplines such as economics, law, or political science. Its foothold in 
disciplines that are less reliant on quantification has been weaker. At a time when 
other fields had adopted the rational actor paradigm, most philosophers had 
alternative views of personhood, including Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas (for an overview see Sharon 
2014). Feminist scholars, including proponents of the care ethics approach, and other 
critics of modern liberal political philosophy, explicitly emphasized that the human 
ability to reason is developed through relationships with others (e.g. Gilligan 1982; 
Strathern 1988; Butler 1990; Meyers 1994). For authors in these traditions, human 
relationality is a precondition for subjectivity, not the other way around (C. Taylor 
1985: Chapter 7; C. Taylor 1989; Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000). We are who we are 
because we relate to others.  
As is well known, postmodern theory in the 1960s and 1970s––spanning many 
disciplines and traditions within the humanities and social sciences––dealt an 
additional blow to the idea of the self as a fixed, coherent and bounded entity. 
Nevertheless, in many areas of public life, the idea of the strategically rational, self-
interested individual has remained the core unit that structures social and political 
space. This view is so deeply engrained in our social and political institutions and 
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legal frameworks (including our understanding of human rights) that it is difficult to 
conceive of an alternative.  
Exemplified by three cases, the next sections of this paper will argue that the deep-
rooted idea of the bounded, autonomous, and strategically rational individual is ill-
suited for regulation, practice, and research in medicine. The first case shows how 
such an understanding of personhood creates problems in end-of-life care–– 
especially when these settings are culturally diverse. If we seek to include in our 
understanding of medicine factors outside of clinical metrics and indicators, 
especially those that subjectively matter to patients, then the improvement of 
protocols and practices of decision making at the end of life are an important goal.  
 
The second case argues that a clear separation between “altruistic” organ donation 
and non-altruistic donation is unhelpful in theory and in practice, and prevents us 
from developing better solutions for the organ shortage. Although organ donation 
may not seem directly related to personalised medicine, the lesson that it teaches us–– 
namely that overcoming the binary opposition between self-interest and care for 
others can lead to better policies––is particularly relevant for personalized medicine. 
It can help to avoid the idea that personalization becomes synonymous with a kind of 
individualization that destroys social bonds and solidarity. Although the latter can be 
the outcome if personalization is taken as an excuse to devolve onerous 
responsibilities from the collective level to individuals, personalization can also entail 
that people affirm and help each other by helping themselves, and vice versa.  
 
The third case shows how the governance of health data also suffers from the problem 
that persons are understood as bounded atomistic individuals. A consequence of this 
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is the lack of recognition of the needs and interests of secondary data subjects––that 
is, people who could be harmed by the use of data that stem not from them but from 
somebody else who is associated with them. Another unfortunate result of an 
atomistic understanding of personhood is the dearth of efforts to strengthen not only 
individual, but also collective, public ownership and oversight to counterbalance the 
increasing power of private corporate actors in the health data domain––an area that 
lies at the core of personalized medicine. In a later section of this paper I will argue 
that solidarity can help to alleviate some of the problems that a focus on self-
interested independent individuals has brought to the field of medicine. It is one that 
also reflects on how we understand the human in human rights. 
 
The comfort of kin?ii Decision making at the end of life 
The principle of informed consent has been one of the ethical foundations of Western 
medical practice since the second half of the 20th century. Understandings of the 
meaning and role of informed consent are far from uniform. They range from treating 
informed consent as an individual right to express one’s personal autonomy, to 
conceptualizations that see consent as a part of an ethical dialogue, or as a permission 
given to others to do things to us that they would otherwise not be allowed to do. The 
latter types of conceptualizations see consent as only one of the many ways of 
expressing autonomy (Manson & O’Neill 2007).  
 
At the same time as consent has been lauded as an important step to help avoid 
deception and coercion, it has attracted a lot of criticism. Such criticism has included, 
for example, that it is impossible for consent to be fully informed and specific; that it 
runs the risk of becoming a formulaic stand-in for ethical dialogue and deliberation; 
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and that it does not automatically increase autonomy in a meaningful way (e.g. 
O’Neill 2003; Manson & O’Neill 2007; Koenig 2014). Over the decades, this critique 
has fuelled improvements and new practical solutions around consent (e.g. O’Neill 
2003; Manson & O’Neill 2007; Beyleveld & Brownsword 2007; Kaye et al. 2011; 
Dove et al. 2011; Prainsack & Buyx 2013). The point I wish to make here, however, 
relates to another, less discussed aspect of informed consent, namely the assumption 
that it expresses a decision that has normally been made by one person. There are, of 
course, mechanisms and protocols in place for persons incapable of giving consent, 
because they may be too young, too frail, unconscious, or in another situation that 
compromises their capacity to make an autonomous decision. The assumption 
remains, however, that the default rule is that only one person needs to consent to 
treatment that is done on her body (see also Dove et al. 2017).  
 
In an impactful article published in 1995, medical anthropologists Barbara Koenig 
and Jan Gates-Williams drew upon ethnographic fieldwork with patients at the end of 
their lives. They described situations where pain was inflicted on patients, family 
members, or medical professionals because existing guidelines and protocols clashed 
with social and cultural norms. As the authors argued, “it is useful to bear in mind that 
in many Asian societies, ideas about ‘selfhood’ vary from the western ideal of an 
autonomous individual” (Koenig & Gates-Williams 1995: 247; see also Sariola & 
Simpson 2011). This does not suggest that there is a dichotomy between community-
based understandings of selfhood in the East and individualistic understandings in the 
West, which would be far too simplistic: The meaning of “culture” unfolds to its full 
extent only in considering the person’s history and environment. The point here is that 
an understanding of personhood that sees people as shaped by their relations with 
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their human, natural and artifactual environments, and as always connected to them, is 
in tension with most of the ethical and legal instruments that govern Western 
biomedicine.  
 
The notion of “relational autonomy” (Balkan 1966; Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000) can be 
helpful here. Already in 1990, Jennifer Nedelsky argued that legal scholarship and 
practice needed “a new conception of the tension between the collective and the 
individual, for which the boundary is not an apt metaphor” (Nedelsky 1990: 162). 
This is the case because “[w]hat actually makes human autonomy possible is not 
isolation but relationship” (1990: 169). Such an approach is strongly influenced by 
feminist scholarship, which––in the words of legal scholar Margaret Jane Radin––is 
generally marked by a “receptiveness to connectedness, to the recognition that human 
life is impossible without nurturing from those who care for us when we are helpless 
and dependent” (Radin 1996: 72; see also Powers & Faden 2006, Nedelsky 1990; 
2011; Zeiler 2007).  
 
In the second half of the 2000s, bioethicists introduced the notion of relational 
autonomy into public health ethics (e.g. Baylis et al. 2008), and it has since been used 
for wider areas of medical ethics and decision making (e.g. Laurie 2014). There have 
been, however, surprisingly few attempts to translate the rich and nuanced critique of 
an individualistic understanding of autonomy into new approaches and tools for 
decision making in the medical domain (Dove et al. 2017). I argue that this is the case 
because much of the critique within medical ethics has focused autonomy instead of 
re-thinking the individual. 
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If we employed an alternative understanding of persons as connected selves 
(Widdows 2013)––underpinned by a notion of relational autonomy, instead of 
atomistic, individualistic autonomy––this would require policies and protocols that 
acknowledge the social nature of decision-making processes (see also Priaulx & 
Wrigley 2013). Decision-making processes at the end of life specifically are social in 
at least two respects: first, in the sense that many patients’ decisions on where and 
how they would like to die are shaped by conversations with family, friends, or 
clinicians; second, in the sense that considerations for other people literally “make 
up” part of who we are, especially at the end of our lives (Strathern 1988; Hacking 
2006). The increasing uptake of models of shared decision making in palliative 
medicine and other areas of clinical care goes a long way in accommodating this 
social nature of decision making (Charles et al. 1997). But it does not go far enough. 
Taking relational autonomy seriously in end-of-life healthcare also means that we 
need to make much stronger use of metrics for the assessment and reimbursement of 
healthcare that go beyond clinical outcomes (see also NHS Scotland 2016). Such a 
focus on factors that matter “subjectively” to patients would also help to make 
healthcare at this stage of life more personal in the deep sense of the word (see also 
Budin-Ljøsne & Harris 2016). 
 
Altruism vs. self-interest: A false distinction in organ donation by living donors 
As noted above, the conceptualization of persons as bounded and ideally independent 
individuals is closely related to the notion of strategic and instrumental rationality. 
Rational action is aimed at maximizing our own benefit. This understanding, in turn, 
rests on the idea that it is possible to distinguish clearly between self-interest and care 
for others. In the field of live organ donation this distinction is one of the fundamental 
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categories guiding legislation and policy: It separates purely “altruistic” donations 
from others that are motivated by other reasons, including allegedly selfish ones. This 
assumption causes problems because the feelings, motivations and practices of people 
typically do not fit into these categories. It could be argued that this misfit between 
the legal and institutional categories on the one hand, and practice on the other, is not 
unique to live organ donation, or even medicine more broadly. The classification 
work done by written rules always needs to be amended by the practical judgement of 
people “enacting” these rules (Wagenaar 2004). What makes the misfit in this field so 
troubling, however, is that if it cannot be bypassed effectively, it affects decisions 
over life and death.  
 
Informal ways of dealing with the misfit between legal categories and social practices 
in the field of live organ donation have emerged in many countries. Marie-Andrée 
Jacob’s (2012) ethnographic study on live organ donation in Israel is one of the few 
that provides insights into the creation of such informal practices. Jacob carried out 
interviews, and observed the work of patients, health care providers, administrators, 
and transplant “brokers.” In the past, Israeli regulations on live organ donations had 
drawn international media attention for accepting forms of organ procurement that 
were seen as morally problematic in other countries. Furthermore, cases of organ 
trafficking especially have made it into the news (e.g. Brimelow 2009). 
 
Orthodox Judaism defines death as the cessation of aerobic activity. For this reason, 
many members of strictly orthodox communities do not accept brain death as a valid 
criterion of death, which makes many cadaveric organ transplantations impossible. As 
a result, the rate of organ donations in Israel is very low compared to Western 
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countries. In 2015, Israel’s cadaveric organ donation rate was at nine per million 
people, compared to 40 per million in Spain, 29 per million in the United States, and 
26 in France.iii The shortage of available cadaveric organs for donation has had two 
main consequences: before organ trafficking was outlawed in 2008, it had led to the 
flourishing of alternative supply channels. And it has led to living donations––mostly 
kidneys––composing the bulk of organ donations in Israel (Boas 2009; Transplant 
Procurement Management 2010).  
 
For living donations, Israeli regulations differentiate between donations within close 
family, within remote family, friends, and “unrelated donations” (Jacob 2012: 35). 
Potential donations within the “unrelated donations” group are referred to as 
“altruistic donations” (Jacob 2012: 37), and a separate kind of committee is set up to 
process applications for donations from this group. To establish whether donations are 
truly altruistic, donors and applicants are interviewed separately by the committee, 
which is explicitly tasked with filtering out donors who secretly receive financial 
compensation from the prospective recipient.  
 
Already at the outset of Jacob’s very rich study it becomes apparent that the reality of 
“matching organs with patients,” as Jacob calls it, does not fit into the categories with 
which the system operates. Perhaps the most pronounced example for how even the 
most “altruistic” motivations always have a self-interested component is the story of 
Sandra, a Christian American who decided to donate a kidney to an Israeli Jewish 
recipient, Yitzhak––and the Israeli hospital committee approved this donation as 
genuinely altruistic. Sandra did not know Yitzhak when she decided to donate a 
kidney to him; she learned about him in a newsletter that a Jewish friend had given to 
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her for her to learn more about Jewish religion. When she read the item on an Israeli 
man with kidney disease who was in desperate need of a donor, Sandra said she 
experienced a moment of divine inspiration: “I was at home alone; I was praying, and 
as I was, God interrupted me, and said: ‘I want you to give your kidney’” (quoted 
from Jacob 2012: 39). This decision, Sandra said, was a source of profound happiness 
for her, a way of enacting her faith. The donation saved Yitzhak’s life, but it helped 
her too. Against this backdrop, drawing a clear line between purely altruistic and self-
serving motivations does not seem to be possible. This is supported by another 
finding from Jacob’s study: She observed how unrelated donors––those suspected of 
purely pecuniary motivations––are regularly encouraged by brokers to make up 
shared stories to qualify for an altruistic donation. But in this process of faking 
closeness, they often develop emotional connections to each other. The result is that, 
also in this group, donations are sometimes not only motivated by “selfish” reasons 
(in addition to the fact that donors who seek payment often do this out of concern for 
children or other family members, which is not a purely selfish motivation either). As 
I will argue below, the best way to accommodate the simultaneity of self-interested 
and other-regarding practice in the field of organ donation would be to give up the 
category of altruistic donations altogether and move to a system that includes 
everybody as a potential donor and as a potential recipient––as long as they do not opt 
out.  
 
Health data governance: Protecting secondary data subjects in data-driven 
personalized medicine 
How we understand personhood has important implications for the way we envisage 
and enact personalized medicine. As noted, while personalized medicine has long 
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been understood as pertaining to the matching of drugs or treatment to genetic 
characteristics of patients, the notion has started to broaden; it now includes wider 
ranges of information and data reflecting individual characteristics of patients. Most 
visions to realize personalized medicine revolve around the idea that data representing 
various aspects of people’s health, diseases, and lives, often in digital and computable 
form, will be integrated in order to tailor healthcare more precisely to the 
characteristics and needs of individual patients (ESF 2012).  
 
Drawing on Graeme Laurie’s work (2001), Mark Taylor (2012) criticizes current 
legal frameworks applicable to the governance of genetic data used for research, 
suggesting that these frameworks wrongly presume “personal data” relate only to the 
person from whom the data originate. “Secondary” data subjects, i.e. people who are 
not the originators of the physical source of genetic data but with whom the 
information can be associated (e.g. family members), currently enjoy far fewer 
privacy protections than primary data subjects. More equality between primary and 
secondary data subjects, Taylor argues, would represent an important step towards 
better data protection frameworks in the context of genetic research, including better 
ways to respond to discrimination: Because many biological data pertain to 
characteristics that are shared between biological relatives, the same set of genetic 
data can disclose information on, or contribute to the identification of, more than one 
individual. iv 
 
The value of Taylor’s argument is not limited to genetic data alone; it applies to a 
much wider range of health data. Information about my mother’s hypertension, my 
neighbour’s mental health problems, and my friend’s breast cancer, for example, all 
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disclose information that can be used to make probabilistic inferences about their 
biological relatives and family members. Health information is social in at least two 
ways: it pertains not only to one person, and in that we make sense of it in connection 
and in collaboration with others. This renders richer and relational understandings of 
the “personal” an important goal.  
 
The practice of solidarity 
Alena Buyx and I have used the notion of solidarity to address challenges in bioethics 
and healthcare by focusing on relations and interactions between people, instead of 
treating social reality as reducible to the actions of independent individuals. We 
understand solidarity not as an abstract value or a sentiment, but first and foremost as 
practice (Cook & Wagenaar 2012). In its most bare-bones form, solidaristic practices 
are those by which people or groups express their willingness to accept “costs” 
(understood widely as any kind of financial, emotional, social, or other contributions) 
to assist others with whom they recognize similarity in a relevant respect. Solidarity at 
the “lowest” level, namely between individuals (tier 1 solidarity), can become so 
common that it becomes a social norm within a group or community (tier 2 
solidarity). If group-based solidarity solidifies further and coagulates into contractual 
or legal norms, then we speak of “tier 3” solidarity. This latter level of solidarity is 
characteristic, for example, of European welfare states (Prainsack & Buyx 2017). 
Solidarity––in contrast to altruism, for example––is a deeply relational practice: it 
requires others with whom we recognize similarity and who are at the receiving end 
of our solidaristic practice. It is also based on a view of persons as relational beings 
whose subjectivities and needs are partly shaped by our human, natural and artifactual 
environments. 
	 18	
 
As the brief cases of decision making at the end of life, of live organ donations, and of 
health data governance have shown, the assumption that social and political space is 
composed of autonomous, independent and strategically rational individuals is 
problematic, and creates tangible issues in the practice and research of medicine. A 
more relational understanding of people and their practices can help here. 
Acknowledging the social nature not only of decision making but of people’s needs 
and interest in a more formal way would thus be a step in the right direction. At first 
sight this may seem difficult to realize: There are important practical and legal 
reasons for the dominance of individual consent, for example, and there are currently 
few, if any, feasible alternatives. Experiments with community consent have proven 
to be too complex to operationalize (Reardon 2005; see also Widdows 2013), and 
they run the risk of prioritizing the decisions of powerful actors, such as village 
elders, powerful patriarchs, over the interests of weaker ones, such as children, 
stigmatized groups, and often also women. The same applies to family consent. Here, 
attempts to overcome the limitations of atomistic individual autonomy run into the 
very problem that legal and ethical instruments focusing on individual autonomy were 
initially destined to solve, namely that people can be harmed by the actions of others. 
This is especially pertinent in cases where procedures are physically invasive or 
otherwise impactful on the body and mind of a specific person. In such cases the 
default solution must be that the person most directly affected needs to give their 
consent. This cannot be devolved to other people in her social environment (except in 
cases where the person cannot give valid consent on her own).  
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As argued in connection with healthcare at the end of life, what institutions can do, 
however, is to acknowledge explicitly that the process leading up to the recording of 
informed consent is a social process rather than a situation of isolated decision 
making based on rational reasoning of individuals. They can treat collective decision 
making as a normal and valuable human practice, and not as something that reflects a 
deviation from standard protocols. The adoption of shared decision making in some 
areas of medicine––especially in the end of life and palliative medicine domains––is 
clearly a positive development, as it provides room for dialogue in the process leading 
up to the expression of the decision, the outcome of which is then recorded in the 
form of consent. Further solutions could entail that patients can request for certain 
people to be adopted as full members of the clinical care team—as increasingly 
practiced in institutions practicing patient-centred care. Finally, protocols for decision 
making at the end of life, and in healthcare more generally, should include the 
consideration of aspects that are meaningful to those involved, rather than 
corresponding to a narrowly defined notion of rationality, safety, or clinical utility (I 
have referred to these as “social biomarkers,” Prainsack 2014; see also Gawande 
2014; NHS Scotland 2016). Such a focus on personal meaning would shift the point 
of gravity of personalised medicine in such a way that it comes closer to patient-
centred healthcare (Kitson et al. 2013).  
  
In the field of live organ donations, we need to cease operating with the distinction 
between altruistic and non-altruistic donations in theory and in practice. This, in turn, 
would have consequences for how we think about “rewards” for donations: If we 
accept that living donations always include both self-interested other-regarding 
considerations on the side of the donor, then donors can be seen to accept certain risks 
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that come along with their donation, and to deserve some reward. Rewards typically 
take two main forms: financial rewards and in-kind rewards. Financial rewards as 
“payments”––namely those that go beyond compensation of income-loss and the 
reimbursement of actual expenses in case of living donations, but also tax credits for 
registered donors, or payments to families of deceased donors––have been criticized 
for many reasons. For example, they bear the risk of exploiting those in need of 
money, and of the commodification of human body parts (e.g. Adair & Wigmore 
2011).  
 
In-kind rewards give potential or actual donors or their family members prioritized 
access to donations. This can be organized on a relatively small scale, in so-called 
“donor clubs” such as LifeSharers (lifesharing.org), or on a national scale (Prainsack 
& Buyx 2017, Chapter 7). Examples of the latter are national systems of presumed 
consent in the context of cadaveric donations. It means that everybody is considered 
an organ donor unless they have explicitly opted out. When presumed consent 
operates in countries with trustworthy institutions, risks for individuals are very small, 
with the biggest risk being that somebody with a religious, spiritual or other important 
reason for not wanting to donate an organ was not aware of the opt-out requirement 
and donates an organ post mortem. While this risk can be avoided by making 
information on the opt-out requirement easily available, or by contacting the deceased 
person’s family to ascertain that she did not have such reservations, the benefits of 
such a system are considerable: A much greater availability of organs that makes the 
consideration of financial rewards unnecessary. The practice of free-riding––namely 
that those who opt out of the donor list would still be eligible to receive donations––
has not proven to be an issue in countries that currently utilize presumed consent. 
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Furthermore, from a relational autonomy point of view, national systems of presumed 
consent are preferable to smaller club-models that reward individual patients or their 
families directly. This is the case because national presumed consent models realize 
indirect forms of reciprocity and rewards that accommodate––and aim to strengthen–
–people’s connections to others, and not only to their immediate family or another 
exclusive group. 
 
Moving away from the distinction between “truly” altruistic vs. self-interested 
motivations for organ donation would have another advantage: It would foreground 
questions that emphasize relational and collective concerns––such as inequalities and 
mechanisms for access and inclusion. It would make us focus on what people have in 
common, and not what sets them apart, and increase the space for the discussion of 
meaning, rather than individual “choices” and motivations. If solidarity is understood, 
as we have suggested, as a practice expressing the commitment to accept “costs” to 
help others with whom we recognize similarity in a relevant respect, then this leads us 
to ask an even wider question that concerns the organization of healthcare as a whole: 
If persons are seen as relational beings whose boundaries are porous, can we isolate 
the benefit and wellbeing of some from the fate of others? If we conclude––as I 
suggest––that we cannot, would this not lead us to supporting universal healthcare 
that is accessible and affordable for all?  
 
In connection with health data governance, the dominant Western understanding of 
people as bounded individuals is reflected in the failure of legal frameworks to protect 
the needs and interests of secondary data subjects (Widdows 2013; M. Taylor 2012). 
Moreover, in the present debate, the focus on atomistic individual autonomy has led 
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to efforts being channelled into increasing individual control over health data use at 
the cost of expanding collective ownership and oversight. If we want to start to 
counterbalance the growing power asymmetry between patients and citizens who give 
data, and large corporations who use them, then we need to also enhance collective 
ownership and control. Ways to do this include the strengthening of harm mitigation 
instruments to ensure that people who are harmed by data use have effective 
remedies––which the legal system does not always provide––as well as placing more 
emphasis on whether or not data use is in the public interest (Prainsack & Buyx 2016; 
Prainsack, forthcoming). 
 
Conclusion: Solidarity in the era of personalized medicine 
Three brief examples from different areas of medical practice have illustrated 
problems with the Western focus on independent and strategically rational individuals 
in different ways. The case of healthcare at the end of life highlights the problems 
posed by the assumption that decisions are regularly made by one person. In the case 
of live organ donations, the idea that people act either out of self-interest or out of 
care for others (“altruism”) has had a range of unintended consequences that are 
arguably best addressed by employing a system of presumed consent with very easy 
opt-out mechanisms for those who do not want to be part of such a solidaristic 
system. In the field of health data governance, I have argued that the social nature of 
data merits the explicit acknowledgement of the interests of secondary data subjects, 
as well as the strengthening of collective ownership and oversight over data 
infrastructures and data use. I have posited that a solidarity-based approach, which is 
underpinned by the conviction that all human practices are relational and thus both 
self-interested and other-oriented at the same time, can help us to move beyond an 
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understanding of individuals as self-interested, bounded entities. It can inform new 
frameworks that acknowledge and support people’s connections to others. Moreover, 
a solidarity-based approach avoids the communitarian weakness of seeming to 
privilege the public good at the cost of the needs and interests of individual people. 
Solidarity-based frameworks start with what people need, want, and do, and, on the 
basis of this, seek to create the circumstances within which practices that support 
others can be more easily “scaled up” to become more widespread. Because of its 
grounding in actual practices and values solidarity is less vulnerable than other pro-
social concepts to being used to justify pushing people into doing something they do 
not want to do for the sake of collective benefit (Prainsack & Buyx 2017; see also 
Howard 1995). v   Solidarity-based frameworks thus emphasize the simultaneous 
importance of personal and collective needs, interests and responsibilities, and focus 
action on the space where the two overlap.    
 
In order to fill the concept of personalized medicine with new meaning that 
accommodates the relational nature of persons and prominently includes also aspects 
of people’s lives that do not lend themselves to precise measurement and 
quantification, we need new ethical and regulatory instruments. These instruments 
need to leave behind old assumptions and categories that have proven unhelpful. The 
concept of solidarity can provide fruitful guidance in the design of these new 
instruments. A solidarity-based perspective means that we can expect that people who 
voluntarily decide to do something for others––may it be volunteering for a biobank, 
participating in decision making, or even donating an organ––accept some “costs” 
(again understood as any contribution of emotional, effort-wise, financial, or other 
nature). In such a model, people’s contributions are best seen as gifts; they are given 
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voluntarily and their value cannot be captured in financial terms (see Zeiler 2014). At 
the same time, the meaning of a specific gift and the meaning of voluntariness are 
shaped also by the social relations and mutual obligations that the gift-giver and the 
recipient are part of. Whilst a giver of a gift does not––or at least should not––expect 
payment or another form of direct compensation for the gift, there is always, as Bob 
Simpson put it, a “web of indebtedness and future reciprocity that the “gift” creates 
once put into circulation” (Simpson 2014: 342).  
 
What is the substantive content of this debt, this reciprocity that the gift articulates 
(besides all the other things that it does)? Given that donors to a biobank, volunteers 
in a hospital, or donors of an organ are typically not part of a physical community that 
shares their values and day-to-day lives with the recipients of their gifts, it is in 
practice often difficult to establish what the standards are that shape the content of 
reciprocal relations and commitments. However, what the gift-giver should be able to 
expect from the recipient is that she will be treated according to the same standards 
that she herself accords the recipient(s). This is why a solidaristic perspective 
mandates that we work towards achieving greater symmetry and reciprocity between 
people within the institutional and organizational context in which the “gift” is given. 
In the context of medicine, this would mean that people are told openly what goals 
and purposes the recipients of their gifts work towards. They should also be able to 
learn about the values and purposes underpinning the group or organization receiving 
the gift. Greater reciprocity would also mean that people can bring their own 
meanings and concerns to the table. They should also be included in what we consider 
the “tapestry of potentially high-value information sources” (Weber et al. 2014). At a 
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moment where most patients are also data donors for research, such a development 
would be more than timely. 
 
Another one of the key implications of a solidarity-based approach to healthcare in 
the era of personalized medicine is a focus on universal healthcare. I have argued that 
by understanding humans as relational creatures whose wellbeing depends on the 
wellbeing of others, it is not possible to draw a clear line between self-interested and 
other-directed practice. But neither is it possible to completely separate the fulfilment 
of needs and interests of any given person from the fulfilment of needs and interests 
of others. Meeting the fundamental needs of all people as well as possible is thus both 
a personal and a collective interest and responsibility. Given that health is one of the 
fundamental––if not the fundamental––needs of human beings, universal and 
affordable healthcare should be the precondition for any other pursuit in medicine. It 
certainly is a precondition for the realization of personalized medicine. Such an 
emphasis on universal healthcare, emerging out of the solidarity-based approach, thus 
does not require an individually enforceable right to health, which would run the risk 
that those who are already privileged are more active or effective in enforcing their 
rights than others. It is a shared interest and responsibility. 
 
Having said this, the relational understanding of personhood underpinning the 
solidarity-based approach is not without implications for our understanding of human 
rights. It affects how we understand the “human” in human rights (see Benedict 
Douglas’s contribution to this Special Issue; Douglas 2018). An atomistic 
understanding of personhood has shaped how human rights have been conceived and 
enacted for centuries: It is the idea of protecting the agency and interests of 
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individuals that the very idea of human rights hinges upon, rendering “humans” and 
“individuals” synonymous. 
 
 Replacing the old Western understanding of the independent individual as the 
structuring principle of our social and political space with a relational understanding 
of personhood does not mean that we stop recognizing the autonomy of people. As 
argued in this paper, especially where people’s physical integrity is at stake, there will 
always be the need to foreground the agency and decision-making power of the 
people in and with these bodies. But as in the domain of human rights, there are clear 
examples of how social relations and collective meaning are already shaping the 
meaning of individual rights. The freedom of religion, the right to family life, and the 
freedom from racial or sexual discrimination are all protected as subjective individual 
rights in human rights frameworks. At the same time, they obtain their meaning 
through characteristics that emerge in the context of groups and communities, not 
individual people; individuals may not even consider themselves to possess the trait 
on the basis of which they experience discrimination (e.g. a person with an exotic and 
“foreign” sounding name that leads to discrimination when applying for jobs, 
although this person does not identify with the group she is seen to belong to). In 
response to this article, Simpson (see Bob Simpson’s contribution to this Special 
Issue; Simpson 2018) makes a case for a “duplex nature of personhood.” This 
approach can guide our way here. In addition to protecting the person with and in the 
body whose integrity is at stake (i.e. protecting rights of individuals), as argued above, 
human rights could also protect persons as part of their human, natural and artifactual 
environments. This, in turn, would mean that the needs and interests of human and 
nonhuman environments of people take a more central role in the interpretation of 
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individual rights. Not to overrule a person’s needs and interests, but to strengthen the 
area where personal and collective needs and interests coincide. 
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i See also Simpson’s discussion of Lambek’s notion of the “forensic person” who he traces back to 
John Locke’s treatment of persons as, in Simpson’s words, “temporally continuous and rationally 
accountable” (Simpson 2018, this Special Issue). Lambek contrasts the forensic person with the 
“mimetic person,” which “highlight[s] temporal discontinuity and difference within the person, 
acknowledging that we are not always fully whole, single, consistent, or sealed off from those 
around us” (Lambek 2013: 852).  
ii  I borrow this headline from the title of Monika Schreiber’s (2014) book The comfort of kin: 
Samaritan community, kinship, and marriage. 
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iii Data were taken from the irodat.com database, which offers continuously updated information on 
organ donation from many countries around the world. 
iv	In forensic identification, for example, DNA information is sometimes used exactly for this purpose 
(e.g. “familial searching”; see Kaye 2013). 
v An exception is when solidaristic arrangements are realized by legal, administrative or bureaucratic 
norms; Alena Buyx and I call it “tier 3” solidarity, which is the most institutionalized form of 
solidarity after interpersonal solidarity (tier 1), and group-based/communal solidarity (tier 2). 
Although strictly speaking solidarity realized by legal norms––such as progressive taxation––does 
not require to be underpinned by actual solidaristic practice by people to be enforceable, it will be 
much more effective if it corresponds with what people want to do and are actually doing.	
